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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Respondent asserts that the Petitioner failed to marshall 
the evidence because she did not point out all of the evidence in 
favor of the Commission's decision and demonstrate why it did not 
support the Commission Conclusion. The Petitioner set forth all of 
the Administrative Law Judge's and Commissions' Findings in Support 
of its decision in her brief. Thus, the petitioner marshalled all 
of the evidence. 
Secondly, The Respondent argues that there was indeed 
substantial evidence to support the Commission's decision. 
However, there was in fact, very little, much less, "substantial" 
evidence to support the Commissions finding of no medical 
causation. 
Third, the respondent argues that legal causation was not 
established and consequently the Petitioner is not entitled to 
benefits. Petitioner did in fact establish legal causation. 
However, the Commission did not make a finding or ruling on the 
establishment of legal causation, but merely found that no medical 
causation was proven. 
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
I. Petitioner properly challenged the Commission's 
Order Denying her Motion for Review. 
The Petitioner did marshall the evidence. In her appellate 
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brief she set forth all of the Findings of Fact by the 
Administrative Law Judge, adopted by the Industrial Commission, in 
support of the Administrative Law Judge's decision that no medical 
causation was established. If Respondent is arguing that the 
petitioner should have gone through the record and speculated as to 
what the Administrative Law Judge would consider as evidence 
supporting his decision, even though he choose not to set it forth 
in his Findings of Fact, then Respondent is in error. Petitioner 
went through each of the Administrative Law Judge Findings in 
Support of his conclusion and discussed those at length in her 
Appeal Brief. Consequently, Petitioner has marshalled all of the 
evidence that the Administrative Law Judge used in arriving at his 
decision. 
It is the Petitioner's contention that when all of the 
Findings of Fact that were considered by the Administrative Law 
Judge and set forth by the Administrative Law Judge are marshalled, 
they do not constitute a reasonable basis by which the 
Administrative Law Judge could have arrived at his decision that 
there was no medical causation. In fact, as is evident by the lack 
of any reference to Dr. Colvert and Dr. Egbert's letters, the 
Administrative Law Judge failed to consider substantial credible 
evidence in arriving at his conclusion. As indicated in those 
letters, the language used by those doctors were not "conjecture" 
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but was set foil! .r; terms of medical probability. 
Re- At because -* titioner * "- "^ 
afford and
 T . •,*.:* » transcii(.: , : 
appeal must fail. Respondent's rite Rules c: Appellate Procedure, 
Rn I i I I I i ,' ," I In .f rtl ( s 
If the appellant intends to urge on appeal 
that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by 
or contrary to the evidence, the appellant 
shall include in the record of transcript of 
all evidence relevant to such finding or 
conclusion. 
T - * Administrat I ve 
Law Judge . • .iJubti ..n Commissioi, .-.. . adequate! y 
consider competent credible evidence set fc ^ * - r- 'Divert m d 
Dr 1-' • r decision. A 
transcript of the hearing w:.>uiii not have shed ai *• upon 
opinions of these doctors. There opinions were not mentioned 
dea. in 
wen- onsidered as a portion : f I: .1 ie medical r ecords exhibit. 
Consequently, Respondents argument is no t relevant to these 
proceedings. 
II. The Commissions' Order denying Brunson's Motion For 
Review should be overturned because it is not 
supported by substantial evidence. 
The Responded 
consider the evidence in the record ^:.-\ specifical.-* .vdiuated a 
vA at t» imp i'li I I in i ii mi petitioner's doc+ --s. xAx^ Responded ai3. states 
that the Commission judged them to be of little consequence and 
within its discretion properly gave them little weight. However, 
the Respondent does not mention how it came to this conclusion. 
The Commissions' Findings are woefully inadequate on this subject. 
They simply take a couple of selective sentences out of each letter 
and then come to the conclusion that the petitioner did not 
establish that her fainting and injury resulted from her 
employment. (See Addendum F Page 1) 
Respondent, in its Brief specifically points to words used by 
the Petitioner's doctors such as "probably" and "most likely" as 
somehow indicating speculation. However, as pointed out in the 
Petitioner's Brief on appeal, according to AMA terms set forth by 
the American Medical Association Guide To Permanent Impairment, 
those words are used to establish medical probability. 
III. The Commission made no finding of no legal 
causation. 
The Respondent argues that the Petitioner did not challenge 
the Commissions' Finding of no legal causation and consequently her 
appeal must fail. A review of the Commission's Order Denying 
Motion For Review, discloses that although the commission mentions 
that legal causation must be established, it does not make a 
finding that legal causation was not established in this case. In 
fact, on page 2 of the Commissions' Order, it states that the focus 
of this case is on the requirement of medical causation. (Addendum 
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J Nevertheless, Petitioner did argue that legal causation 
was ". -.: . ( I I " ritioner'^ brief K T • *-
Petitioner is appealing the order ..ausi 
deny--. - t* L Motion For Review, not the Order oi -.!;•.• Administrative 
Law Judge. 
CONCLUSION 
Base Pr * *• ; '^er respectful .1 y 
requests that Uu „, ' i * i " i jL a i i ' ! i i c i i «o t ^ t A %_- ^ i *. „ , .,. t_ l, a. > I II! Il I 
the Order * <• Endustrial Commissici rh~ preponderance el he 
medica causation. The ] etters 
t :i» : ioctors were stated m teims oi medical probab^ . . * 
c -* isregardec - t b« Adnu ni strati vi- -aw Judge. They were 
only given inadequc uommission. 
Thu^ LH Conciu /twii , .1 :»»• Industrial Commissi^ . s there was no 
in disregarded competent credible medical evidence 
supporting tin , .-.ileal causal. iun. 
A transcript :n this natter wt-uti "*•- U H \ T nssiste-..: .^> he 
d^tpn HI HI, nil i whether - i •* * he Administrative Law Judge 
disregarded t*.<- competent ex _ :.• ctois 
letters, and consequently weie •• lequjteit 
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There was no finding by the Industrial Commission that the 
Petitioner failed to establish legal causation and consequently was 
not an issue to be raised upon appeal. 
DATED this QlS^day of October, 1995. 
uo 
WAYNE A.HFREESTONE 
Attorney for Applicant 
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